Note that all the formatting has been stripped due to the process of copying and pasting.
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997)
FACTS: Two days prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the respondent, Paula Jones, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas against the sitting president, William Jefferson Clinton, the petitioner in this case, and Danny Ferguson, a former Arkansas State Police officer. The complaint alleges two federal claims, and two state law claims over which the federal court has jurisdiction because of the diverse citizenship of the parties. The allegations stem from “abhorrent” sexual advances made by the petitioner against the respondent at an official conference in Little Rock, Arkansas. Respondent alleges that her superiors subsequently dealt with her in a hostile and rude manner after rejecting the petitioner’s advances. She also alleges that, after the respondent was elected President, Ferguson had defamed her with his comments to a reporter.
In response, the petitioner made a motion to dismiss on grounds of Presidential immunity. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, however the court did rule that the trial would be postponed until after the Clinton presidency. Both parties appealed this ruling. The Court of Appeals upheld the denial of the motion to dismiss, however they also ruled that the trial should not be postponed, stating “the President, like all other government officials, is subject to the same laws that apply to other members of society.”
ISSUE: Does the Constitution afford the President temporary immunity from civil damages litigation arising out of events that occurred before he took office?
REASONING: Justice Stevens: Petitioner's principal submission--that "in all but the most exceptional cases," the Constitution affords the President temporary immunity from civil damages litigation arising out of events that occurred before he took office--cannot be sustained on the basis of precedent.
Only three sitting Presidents have been defendants in civil litigation involving their actions prior to taking office. Complaints against Theodore Roosevelt and Harry Truman had been dismissed before they took office; the dismissals were affirmed after their respective inaugurations. Two companion cases arising out of an automobile accident were filed against John F. Kennedy in 1960 during the Presidential campaign. After taking office, he unsuccessfully argued that his status as Commander in Chief gave him a right to a stay under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940. The motion for a stay was denied by the District Court, and the matter was settled out of court. Thus, none of those cases sheds any light on the constitutional issue before us.
The principal rationale for affording certain public servants immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct. In cases involving prosecutors, legislators, and judges we have repeatedly explained that the immunity serves the public interest in enabling such officials to perform their designated functions effectively without fear that a particular decision may give rise to personal liability....
That rationale provided the principal basis for our holding that a former President of the United States was "entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts." Our central concern was to avoid rendering the President "unduly cautious in the discharge of his official duties."
This reasoning provides no support for an immunity for unofficial conduct. As we explained in Fitzgerald, "the sphere of protected action must be related closely to the immunity's justifying purposes." Because of the President's broad responsibilities, we recognized in that case an immunity from damages claims arising out of official acts extending to the "outer perimeter of his authority." But we have never suggested that the President, or any other official, has an immunity that extends beyond the scope of any action taken in an official capacity.
Moreover, when defining the scope of an immunity for acts clearly taken within an official capacity, we have applied a functional approach. "Frequently our decisions have held that an official's absolute immunity should extend only to acts in performance of particular functions of his office." As our opinions have made clear, immunities are grounded in "the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it."
Petitioner's effort to construct an immunity from suit for unofficial acts grounded purely in the identity of his office is unsupported by precedent.
DECISION: Affirmed.
RULE: No, immunities are grounded in the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it. Immunities apply only to official acts so that officials do not fear personal liability from execution of their official duties.
CONCURRING: Justice Breyer [omitted from text]
DISSENTING: None.
NOTES AND COMMENTS: Two cases were cited in the decision, Nixon v. Fitzgerald (1982) and Marbury v. Madison (1803). Fitzgerald was referenced in the district court decision and again in the Supreme Court’s decision. The Marbury v. Madison (1803) quotation was one of the most memorable and key parts of that decision; “it is emphatically the province of the judicial department to say what the law is.”
Monday, October 8, 2007
Constitutional Law Case Brief - Clinton v. City of New York (1998)
Note that the formatting of this brief has been stripped in the copying and pasting process.
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)
FACTS: In April 1996, Congress passed the Line Item Veto Act, which gave the President the power to “cancel in whole” certain spending items. Shortly after its enactment, six members of Congress who had voted against the law filed suit in the United States District court for the District of Columbia. The district court held the act unconstitutional; however, the Supreme Court ruled that these members of Congress lacked standing because they had not suffered direct injury from the act (Raines v. Byrd, 1997). Within two months of the decision, President Clinton exercised his power under the statute to cancel one provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, and two provisions in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. In response, several affected parties, including the City of New York, challenged the act in the same district court. Once again, the district court held the law invalid. The case was then heard by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Does the Line Item Veto Act violate the Presentment Clause of the Constitution?
REASONING: Justice Stevens: We…agree that the cancellation procedures set forth in the Act violate the Presentment Clause of the Constitution…
In both legal and practical effect, the President has amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each…There is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes…after a bill has passed both Houses of Congress, but "before it become[s] a Law," it must be presented to the President. If he approves it, "he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.
There are important differences between the President's "return" of a bill pursuant to Article 1, §7, and the exercise of the President's cancellation authority pursuant to the Line Item Veto Act. The constitutional return takes place before the bill becomes law; the statutory cancellation occurs after the bill becomes law. The constitutional return is of the entire bill; the statutory cancellation is of only a part. Although the Constitution expressly authorizes the President to play a role in the process of enacting statutes, it is silent on the subject of unilateral Presidential action that either repeals or amends parts of duly enacted statutes.
What has emerged in these cases from the President's exercise of his statutory cancellation powers, however, are truncated versions of two bills that passed both Houses of Congress. They are not the product of the "finely wrought" procedure that the Framers designed.
Our decision rests on the narrow ground that the procedures authorized by the Line Item Veto Act are not authorized by the Constitution. If there is to be a new procedure in which the President will play a different role in determining the final text of what may "become a law," such change must come not by legislation but through the amendment procedures set forth in Article V of the Constitution.
DECISION: Affirmed.
RULE: The new procedures in the Line Item Veto Act violate the Presentment Clause of the Constitution. If there is to be a new procedure for determining how a bill becomes a law, an amendment to the Constitution must be passed.
DISSENTING: Justice Scalia: Unlike the Court I find the President’s cancellation of spending items to be entirely in accord with the Constitution…Had the Line Item Veto Act authorized the President to “decline to spend” any item of spending contained in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, there is not the slightest doubt that authorization would have been constitutional…authorizing the President to “cancel” an item of spending – is technically different. But the technical difference does not relate to the technicalities of the Presentment Clause, which have been fully complied with…because I find no party before us who has standing to challenge the President’s cancellation…I do not reach the question whether that violates the Constitution…
Justice Breyer: In my view the Line Item Veto Act does not violate any specific textual constitutional command, nor does it violate any implicit Separation of Powers principle. Consequently, I believe that the Act is constitutional…@hen the President “cancelled” the two appropriation measures now before us, he did not repeal any law nor did he amend any law…One could not say that a President who “prevent(s)” the deeming language from “having legal force or effect,” has either repealed or amended this particular hypothetical statute. Rather, the President has followed that law to the letter.
NOTES AND COMMENTS: A case from 1890, Field v. Clark, was mentioned in the opinion of the court. This case was used by the government in its defense of the Act. The case dealt with the suspension of tariffs by the President. The court dismissed this use of this case as a possible precedent due to the point that the facts in this case did not deal with an exercise of legislative power.
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)
FACTS: In April 1996, Congress passed the Line Item Veto Act, which gave the President the power to “cancel in whole” certain spending items. Shortly after its enactment, six members of Congress who had voted against the law filed suit in the United States District court for the District of Columbia. The district court held the act unconstitutional; however, the Supreme Court ruled that these members of Congress lacked standing because they had not suffered direct injury from the act (Raines v. Byrd, 1997). Within two months of the decision, President Clinton exercised his power under the statute to cancel one provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, and two provisions in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. In response, several affected parties, including the City of New York, challenged the act in the same district court. Once again, the district court held the law invalid. The case was then heard by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Does the Line Item Veto Act violate the Presentment Clause of the Constitution?
REASONING: Justice Stevens: We…agree that the cancellation procedures set forth in the Act violate the Presentment Clause of the Constitution…
In both legal and practical effect, the President has amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each…There is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes…after a bill has passed both Houses of Congress, but "before it become[s] a Law," it must be presented to the President. If he approves it, "he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.
There are important differences between the President's "return" of a bill pursuant to Article 1, §7, and the exercise of the President's cancellation authority pursuant to the Line Item Veto Act. The constitutional return takes place before the bill becomes law; the statutory cancellation occurs after the bill becomes law. The constitutional return is of the entire bill; the statutory cancellation is of only a part. Although the Constitution expressly authorizes the President to play a role in the process of enacting statutes, it is silent on the subject of unilateral Presidential action that either repeals or amends parts of duly enacted statutes.
What has emerged in these cases from the President's exercise of his statutory cancellation powers, however, are truncated versions of two bills that passed both Houses of Congress. They are not the product of the "finely wrought" procedure that the Framers designed.
Our decision rests on the narrow ground that the procedures authorized by the Line Item Veto Act are not authorized by the Constitution. If there is to be a new procedure in which the President will play a different role in determining the final text of what may "become a law," such change must come not by legislation but through the amendment procedures set forth in Article V of the Constitution.
DECISION: Affirmed.
RULE: The new procedures in the Line Item Veto Act violate the Presentment Clause of the Constitution. If there is to be a new procedure for determining how a bill becomes a law, an amendment to the Constitution must be passed.
DISSENTING: Justice Scalia: Unlike the Court I find the President’s cancellation of spending items to be entirely in accord with the Constitution…Had the Line Item Veto Act authorized the President to “decline to spend” any item of spending contained in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, there is not the slightest doubt that authorization would have been constitutional…authorizing the President to “cancel” an item of spending – is technically different. But the technical difference does not relate to the technicalities of the Presentment Clause, which have been fully complied with…because I find no party before us who has standing to challenge the President’s cancellation…I do not reach the question whether that violates the Constitution…
Justice Breyer: In my view the Line Item Veto Act does not violate any specific textual constitutional command, nor does it violate any implicit Separation of Powers principle. Consequently, I believe that the Act is constitutional…@hen the President “cancelled” the two appropriation measures now before us, he did not repeal any law nor did he amend any law…One could not say that a President who “prevent(s)” the deeming language from “having legal force or effect,” has either repealed or amended this particular hypothetical statute. Rather, the President has followed that law to the letter.
NOTES AND COMMENTS: A case from 1890, Field v. Clark, was mentioned in the opinion of the court. This case was used by the government in its defense of the Act. The case dealt with the suspension of tariffs by the President. The court dismissed this use of this case as a possible precedent due to the point that the facts in this case did not deal with an exercise of legislative power.
Constitutional Law Brief - Eakin v. Raub (1825)
This is probably the last crappy brief I did. After this brief I started to catch on to this a bit better. Note that the formatting is stripped from this brief from the copying and pasting process.
Eakin v. Raub, 12 Sergeant & Rawle (Pennsylvania Supreme Court) 330 (1825)
FACTS: None given.
ISSUE: Is Justice Marshall’s concept of judicial review proper?
REASONING: Justice Gibson: It is the business of the judiciary to interpret the laws, not scan the authority of the lawgiver; and without the latter, it cannot take cognizance of a collision between a law and the constitution. So that to affirm that the judiciary has a right to judge of the existence of such collision, is to take for granted the very thing to be proved.
In theory, all the organs of the government are of equal capacity; or, if not equal, each must be supposed to have superior capacity only for those things which peculiarly belong to it; and as legislation peculiarly involves the consideration of those limitations which are put on the law-making power, and the interpretation of the laws when made, involves only the construction of the laws themselves, it follows, that the construction of the Constitution, in this particular, belongs to the legislature, which ought, therefore, to be taken to have superior capacity to judge of the constitutionality of its own acts.
I am of [the] opinion, that it rests with the people, in whom full and absolute sovereign power resides, to correct abuses in legislation, by instructing the representatives to repeal the obnoxious act. What is wanting to plenary power in the government, is reserved by the people, for their own immediate use; and to redress infringement of their rights in this respect, would seem to be an accessory of the power thus reserved. It might, perhaps, have been better to vest the power in the judiciary; as it might be expected, that its habits of deliberation, and the aid derived from the arguments of counsel, would more frequently lead to accurate conclusions. On the other hand, the judiciary is not infallible; and an error by it would admit of no remedy but a more distinct expression of the public will, through the extraordinary medium of a convention; whereas, an error by the legislature admits of a remedy by an exertion of the same will, in the ordinary exercise of the right of suffrage — a mode better calculated to attain the end, without popular excitement. It may be said, the people would probably not notice an error of their representatives. But they would as probably do so, as notice an error of the judiciary; and beside, it is a postulate in the theory of our government, and the very basis of the superstructure, that the people are wise, virtuous, and competent to manage their own affairs.
NOTES AND COMMENTS: From this decision, it appears that both Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Gibson agree that the will of the people is supreme; however, the two justices have different opinions of how the people exercise their will. Chief Justice Marshall believes that the will of the people is expressed through the constitution; Justice Gibson believes that the will of the people is expressed through the ballot.
Eakin v. Raub, 12 Sergeant & Rawle (Pennsylvania Supreme Court) 330 (1825)
FACTS: None given.
ISSUE: Is Justice Marshall’s concept of judicial review proper?
REASONING: Justice Gibson: It is the business of the judiciary to interpret the laws, not scan the authority of the lawgiver; and without the latter, it cannot take cognizance of a collision between a law and the constitution. So that to affirm that the judiciary has a right to judge of the existence of such collision, is to take for granted the very thing to be proved.
In theory, all the organs of the government are of equal capacity; or, if not equal, each must be supposed to have superior capacity only for those things which peculiarly belong to it; and as legislation peculiarly involves the consideration of those limitations which are put on the law-making power, and the interpretation of the laws when made, involves only the construction of the laws themselves, it follows, that the construction of the Constitution, in this particular, belongs to the legislature, which ought, therefore, to be taken to have superior capacity to judge of the constitutionality of its own acts.
I am of [the] opinion, that it rests with the people, in whom full and absolute sovereign power resides, to correct abuses in legislation, by instructing the representatives to repeal the obnoxious act. What is wanting to plenary power in the government, is reserved by the people, for their own immediate use; and to redress infringement of their rights in this respect, would seem to be an accessory of the power thus reserved. It might, perhaps, have been better to vest the power in the judiciary; as it might be expected, that its habits of deliberation, and the aid derived from the arguments of counsel, would more frequently lead to accurate conclusions. On the other hand, the judiciary is not infallible; and an error by it would admit of no remedy but a more distinct expression of the public will, through the extraordinary medium of a convention; whereas, an error by the legislature admits of a remedy by an exertion of the same will, in the ordinary exercise of the right of suffrage — a mode better calculated to attain the end, without popular excitement. It may be said, the people would probably not notice an error of their representatives. But they would as probably do so, as notice an error of the judiciary; and beside, it is a postulate in the theory of our government, and the very basis of the superstructure, that the people are wise, virtuous, and competent to manage their own affairs.
NOTES AND COMMENTS: From this decision, it appears that both Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Gibson agree that the will of the people is supreme; however, the two justices have different opinions of how the people exercise their will. Chief Justice Marshall believes that the will of the people is expressed through the constitution; Justice Gibson believes that the will of the people is expressed through the ballot.
Constitutional Law Case Brief - City of Boerne v. Flores (1997)
Note that the formatting of this brief was stripped in the copying and pasting process.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
FACTS: A Catholic Archbishop in San Antonio applied for a building permit to enlarge a church in Boerne, Texas. Local officials denied his permit request under a historic preservation ordinance. The Archbishop challenged this denial, claiming that the denial was a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993. Congress enacted RFRA in response to Employment Division v. Smith (1990), which upheld, despite a challenge under the free exercise clause, the denial of unemployment benefits to Native Americans that lost their jobs because of ritual use of peyote. In RFRA, Congress, relying on previous Supreme Court decisions and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibited government agencies and officials from “substantially burden[ing]” the exercise of religion if the burden results from application of a law of general applicability, unless the government can establish that the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive way to further that interest. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas concluded that Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court decision.
ISSUE: Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993 violate the separation of powers in the Constitution?
REASONING: Justice Kennedy: All must acknowledge that Section 5 (of the Fourteenth Amendment is “a positive grant of legislative power” to Congress…it is also true, however, that “as broad as the congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited.”…Congress’ power under Section 5, however, extends only to “enforc[ing]” the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment…The design of the Amendment and the text of Section 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States.
Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right be changing what the right is…Were it not so, what Congress would be enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the “provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].”
Any suggestion that Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our case law. If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning, no longer would the Constitution be “superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.” It would be on a level with ordinary legislative acts.
DECISION: Reversed.
RULE: RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance. As a result, the law is unconstitutional.
DISSENTING: Justice O’Connor: The Court’s analysis of whether RFRA is a constitutional exercise of Congress’ Section 5 power…is premised on the assumption that Smith correctly interprets the Free Exercise Clause. This is an assumption that I do not accept.
The Free Exercise Clause is not simply an antidiscrimination principle that protects only against those laws that single out a religious practice for unfavorable treatment. Rather, the Clause is best understood as an affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in religious practices and conduct without permissible governmental interference, even when such conduct conflicts with a neutral, generally applicable law.
NOTES AND COMMENTS: This case is one of the classic examples of Congress trying to overturn a court decision with a statute. This tactic is rarely successful; a constitutional amendment is they only surefire remedy for Congress to get its way.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
FACTS: A Catholic Archbishop in San Antonio applied for a building permit to enlarge a church in Boerne, Texas. Local officials denied his permit request under a historic preservation ordinance. The Archbishop challenged this denial, claiming that the denial was a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993. Congress enacted RFRA in response to Employment Division v. Smith (1990), which upheld, despite a challenge under the free exercise clause, the denial of unemployment benefits to Native Americans that lost their jobs because of ritual use of peyote. In RFRA, Congress, relying on previous Supreme Court decisions and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibited government agencies and officials from “substantially burden[ing]” the exercise of religion if the burden results from application of a law of general applicability, unless the government can establish that the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive way to further that interest. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas concluded that Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court decision.
ISSUE: Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993 violate the separation of powers in the Constitution?
REASONING: Justice Kennedy: All must acknowledge that Section 5 (of the Fourteenth Amendment is “a positive grant of legislative power” to Congress…it is also true, however, that “as broad as the congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited.”…Congress’ power under Section 5, however, extends only to “enforc[ing]” the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment…The design of the Amendment and the text of Section 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States.
Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right be changing what the right is…Were it not so, what Congress would be enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the “provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].”
Any suggestion that Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our case law. If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning, no longer would the Constitution be “superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.” It would be on a level with ordinary legislative acts.
DECISION: Reversed.
RULE: RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance. As a result, the law is unconstitutional.
DISSENTING: Justice O’Connor: The Court’s analysis of whether RFRA is a constitutional exercise of Congress’ Section 5 power…is premised on the assumption that Smith correctly interprets the Free Exercise Clause. This is an assumption that I do not accept.
The Free Exercise Clause is not simply an antidiscrimination principle that protects only against those laws that single out a religious practice for unfavorable treatment. Rather, the Clause is best understood as an affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in religious practices and conduct without permissible governmental interference, even when such conduct conflicts with a neutral, generally applicable law.
NOTES AND COMMENTS: This case is one of the classic examples of Congress trying to overturn a court decision with a statute. This tactic is rarely successful; a constitutional amendment is they only surefire remedy for Congress to get its way.
Constitutional Law Brief - Scott v. Sandford (1857)
This is the brief I put together for the infamous Dred Scott case about slavery. Note the two spellings of San(d)ford. This is not a mistake on my part, as Sanford's name is incorrectly spelled in the actual case. Once again, note that the formatting has been stripped from this brief. This was also one of my first briefs, so it probably isn't that good. Enjoy!
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.; 19 Howard 393; 15 L.Ed. 691 (1857)
FACTS: In 1834, Dr. John Emerson, a surgeon in the Army, took Dred Scott, his slave, from Missouri to Illinois, a state which did not allow slavery. In 1836 Emerson took Scott to present-day Minnesota, where slavery had been banned by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. In 1838 Emerson returned to Missouri with Scott. After Emerson died, a suit was brought in Missouri against Emerson’s widow, claiming that Scott should be free because he resided in a free territory at one time. After Mrs. Emerson remarried an abolitionist, ownership of Scott was transferred to her brother, John Sanford of New York, to allow this case to continue without embarrassing Mrs. Emerson’s new family. Scott had won at the trial level, but had been defeated at the state supreme court level. On a writ of error from an adverse judgment, Scott appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Do slaves have the right or privilege of filing suit?
REASONING: Chief Justice Taney: The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the citizen? One of which rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States in the cases specified in the Constitution…
We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States…
Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the court that the act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this kind in the territory of the United States north of the line therein mentioned, is not warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore void; and that neither Dred Scott himself, nor any of his family, were made free by being carried into this territory; even if they had been carried there by the owner, with the intention of becoming a permanent resident.
DECISION: Dismissed.
RULE: One must be a citizen of the United States to have the rights and privileges which the Constitution provides. Among these privileges is access to the court system. Without such privilege, the court has no jurisdiction.
DISSENTING: Justice Curtis: At the time of the ratification of the Articles of Confederation, all free native-born inhabitants of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and North Carolina, though descended from African slaves, were not only citizens of those States, but such of them as had the other necessary qualifications possessed the franchise of electors, on equal terms with other citizens.
I feel obliged to say that, in my opinion, such an exertion of judicial power transcends the limits of the authority of the court, as described by its repeated decisions, and, as I understand, acknowledged in this opinion of the majority of the court.
Nor, in my judgment, will the position, that a prohibition to bring slaves into a Territory deprives any one of his property without due process of law, bear examination.
NOTES AND COMMENTS: This decision also determined that the Missouri Compromise of 1820, which banned slavery north of the 36° 30’ line in the Louisiana territory, was void, because “an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offense against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.”
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.; 19 Howard 393; 15 L.Ed. 691 (1857)
FACTS: In 1834, Dr. John Emerson, a surgeon in the Army, took Dred Scott, his slave, from Missouri to Illinois, a state which did not allow slavery. In 1836 Emerson took Scott to present-day Minnesota, where slavery had been banned by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. In 1838 Emerson returned to Missouri with Scott. After Emerson died, a suit was brought in Missouri against Emerson’s widow, claiming that Scott should be free because he resided in a free territory at one time. After Mrs. Emerson remarried an abolitionist, ownership of Scott was transferred to her brother, John Sanford of New York, to allow this case to continue without embarrassing Mrs. Emerson’s new family. Scott had won at the trial level, but had been defeated at the state supreme court level. On a writ of error from an adverse judgment, Scott appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Do slaves have the right or privilege of filing suit?
REASONING: Chief Justice Taney: The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the citizen? One of which rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States in the cases specified in the Constitution…
We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States…
Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the court that the act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this kind in the territory of the United States north of the line therein mentioned, is not warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore void; and that neither Dred Scott himself, nor any of his family, were made free by being carried into this territory; even if they had been carried there by the owner, with the intention of becoming a permanent resident.
DECISION: Dismissed.
RULE: One must be a citizen of the United States to have the rights and privileges which the Constitution provides. Among these privileges is access to the court system. Without such privilege, the court has no jurisdiction.
DISSENTING: Justice Curtis: At the time of the ratification of the Articles of Confederation, all free native-born inhabitants of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and North Carolina, though descended from African slaves, were not only citizens of those States, but such of them as had the other necessary qualifications possessed the franchise of electors, on equal terms with other citizens.
I feel obliged to say that, in my opinion, such an exertion of judicial power transcends the limits of the authority of the court, as described by its repeated decisions, and, as I understand, acknowledged in this opinion of the majority of the court.
Nor, in my judgment, will the position, that a prohibition to bring slaves into a Territory deprives any one of his property without due process of law, bear examination.
NOTES AND COMMENTS: This decision also determined that the Missouri Compromise of 1820, which banned slavery north of the 36° 30’ line in the Louisiana territory, was void, because “an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offense against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.”
Constitutional Law Case Brief - Marbury v. Madison (1803)
Note that this was one of the first cases I briefed. I don't think I did that great of a job. Also note that a lot of the formatting has been stripped in the pasting process. For example, the names of the parties are not properly underlined and the spacing is off. That's just what you get on a free site. Remember, no plagiarizing! This is just an example!
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803)
FACTS: Weeks before leaving office, President John Adams nominated William Marbury and others to be justices of the peace in the District of Columbia. Their nominations were confirmed and commissions signed by the president, but the secretary of state, John Marshall, had not delivered them by the time Thomas Jefferson became president. Jefferson’s new secretary of state, James Madison, refused to deliver the commissions of Marbury and three others. The four men requested that the Supreme Court issue a writ of mandamus ordering delivery under its original jurisdiction authorized in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Mandamus was not requested from lower federal courts.
ISSUE: There are two issues in this case. First, does Marbury have a right to the commission he demands? Second, if he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of this country afford him a remedy?
REASONING: Chief Justice Marshall: Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the President, and sealed by the Secretary of State, was appointed; and as the law creating the office, gave the officer a right to hold for five years, independent of the executive, the appointment was not revocable, but vested in the officer legal rights, which are protected by the laws of his country. To withhold his commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right…
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.
The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States authorizes the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.
The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; and, consequently, in some form, may be exercised over the present case; because the right claimed is given by a law of the United States.
In the distribution of this power it is declared that "the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.
If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to apportion the judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be vested. The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, if such is to be the construction. If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance.
The authority, therefore, given to the Supreme Court, by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution and it becomes necessary to inquire whether a jurisdiction so conferred can be exercised.
The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution can become the law of the land is a question deeply interesting to the United States...
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different departments their respective powers. It may either stop here, or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments. The constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution. It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank. Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.
DECISION: Rule discharged.
RULE: The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The authority given to the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the Constitution; therefore, the court can not force Madison to deliver the commissions.
DISSENTING: None
NOTES AND COMMENTS: This case is one of the most well-known court cases because of Marshall’s decision which established judicial review. His statement that “it is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is” has established the framework for judicial determination of the law.
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803)
FACTS: Weeks before leaving office, President John Adams nominated William Marbury and others to be justices of the peace in the District of Columbia. Their nominations were confirmed and commissions signed by the president, but the secretary of state, John Marshall, had not delivered them by the time Thomas Jefferson became president. Jefferson’s new secretary of state, James Madison, refused to deliver the commissions of Marbury and three others. The four men requested that the Supreme Court issue a writ of mandamus ordering delivery under its original jurisdiction authorized in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Mandamus was not requested from lower federal courts.
ISSUE: There are two issues in this case. First, does Marbury have a right to the commission he demands? Second, if he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of this country afford him a remedy?
REASONING: Chief Justice Marshall: Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the President, and sealed by the Secretary of State, was appointed; and as the law creating the office, gave the officer a right to hold for five years, independent of the executive, the appointment was not revocable, but vested in the officer legal rights, which are protected by the laws of his country. To withhold his commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right…
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.
The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States authorizes the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.
The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; and, consequently, in some form, may be exercised over the present case; because the right claimed is given by a law of the United States.
In the distribution of this power it is declared that "the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.
If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to apportion the judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be vested. The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, if such is to be the construction. If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance.
The authority, therefore, given to the Supreme Court, by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution and it becomes necessary to inquire whether a jurisdiction so conferred can be exercised.
The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution can become the law of the land is a question deeply interesting to the United States...
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different departments their respective powers. It may either stop here, or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments. The constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution. It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank. Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.
DECISION: Rule discharged.
RULE: The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The authority given to the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the Constitution; therefore, the court can not force Madison to deliver the commissions.
DISSENTING: None
NOTES AND COMMENTS: This case is one of the most well-known court cases because of Marshall’s decision which established judicial review. His statement that “it is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is” has established the framework for judicial determination of the law.
Case Law Briefs - How to Brief a Case!
Learning how to brief a case is a lot like learning how to ride a bike. At first it may be difficult and you might get a few scrapes along the way, but eventually it will become easier. I have only been briefing constitutional cases for about 6 weeks and I have noticed that I have become a lot better at it and it has become much easier.
If you are reading this blog you are probably already in a Constitutional Law class. It is probably safe to assume that your professor has shown you how to brief a case. It is also possible that you are getting a head start on the semester too, so I'll briefly show you how I have been taught to brief a case. Make sure that you amend this process as necessary to meet the requirements of your individual instructor.
Integral parts of a case brief and a description of each component
THE CITATION: This is usually at the top of the brief and centered. It consists of the name of the case, the reference to where it can be found in the record, and the date. Ex. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). Note that the names of the parties in the case are always underlined.
THE FACTS: These are the important facts and the background of the case. Keep in mind that these are called "briefs" for a reason. It is your job to discern what is material and include it here. You should not list all of the facts; only list the key facts that explain the case. Be sure to include what the lower courts decided in the case.
THE ISSUE: Each case is being studied because it represents a specific constitutional law issue. It is your job to come up with a brief statement or question that sums up the important legal question.
THE REASONING: One of the justices wrote the majority opinion. In this section you will pluck out the key points that take the judges from the facts to the decision. Many court cases will have lengthy decisions. This is the place where you pull out the key parts so that a simple coherent argument remains.
THE DECISION: What did the court do in this case? A simple statement will usually suffice. Examples include "Affirmed" or "Reversed".
THE RULE: Earlier in the brief you probably listed the question the court was resolving. Your statement of the "rule" should be the answer to this question. If the rule does not resolve the issue, then you either have the issue, the rule, or both incorrect.
THE DISSENTING AND/OR CONCURRING OPINIONS: Unless this case had a 9-0 decision, there are most likely other opinions. In this section you will provide the reasoning for other viewpoints.
YOUR NOTES/COMMENTS: In this section you will post your reflections on this case or list interesting or important information not included elsewhere in your brief.
If you are reading this blog you are probably already in a Constitutional Law class. It is probably safe to assume that your professor has shown you how to brief a case. It is also possible that you are getting a head start on the semester too, so I'll briefly show you how I have been taught to brief a case. Make sure that you amend this process as necessary to meet the requirements of your individual instructor.
Integral parts of a case brief and a description of each component
THE CITATION: This is usually at the top of the brief and centered. It consists of the name of the case, the reference to where it can be found in the record, and the date. Ex. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). Note that the names of the parties in the case are always underlined.
THE FACTS: These are the important facts and the background of the case. Keep in mind that these are called "briefs" for a reason. It is your job to discern what is material and include it here. You should not list all of the facts; only list the key facts that explain the case. Be sure to include what the lower courts decided in the case.
THE ISSUE: Each case is being studied because it represents a specific constitutional law issue. It is your job to come up with a brief statement or question that sums up the important legal question.
THE REASONING: One of the justices wrote the majority opinion. In this section you will pluck out the key points that take the judges from the facts to the decision. Many court cases will have lengthy decisions. This is the place where you pull out the key parts so that a simple coherent argument remains.
THE DECISION: What did the court do in this case? A simple statement will usually suffice. Examples include "Affirmed" or "Reversed".
THE RULE: Earlier in the brief you probably listed the question the court was resolving. Your statement of the "rule" should be the answer to this question. If the rule does not resolve the issue, then you either have the issue, the rule, or both incorrect.
THE DISSENTING AND/OR CONCURRING OPINIONS: Unless this case had a 9-0 decision, there are most likely other opinions. In this section you will provide the reasoning for other viewpoints.
YOUR NOTES/COMMENTS: In this section you will post your reflections on this case or list interesting or important information not included elsewhere in your brief.
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