Note that all the formatting has been stripped due to the process of copying and pasting.
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997)
FACTS: Two days prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the respondent, Paula Jones, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas against the sitting president, William Jefferson Clinton, the petitioner in this case, and Danny Ferguson, a former Arkansas State Police officer. The complaint alleges two federal claims, and two state law claims over which the federal court has jurisdiction because of the diverse citizenship of the parties. The allegations stem from “abhorrent” sexual advances made by the petitioner against the respondent at an official conference in Little Rock, Arkansas. Respondent alleges that her superiors subsequently dealt with her in a hostile and rude manner after rejecting the petitioner’s advances. She also alleges that, after the respondent was elected President, Ferguson had defamed her with his comments to a reporter.
In response, the petitioner made a motion to dismiss on grounds of Presidential immunity. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, however the court did rule that the trial would be postponed until after the Clinton presidency. Both parties appealed this ruling. The Court of Appeals upheld the denial of the motion to dismiss, however they also ruled that the trial should not be postponed, stating “the President, like all other government officials, is subject to the same laws that apply to other members of society.”
ISSUE: Does the Constitution afford the President temporary immunity from civil damages litigation arising out of events that occurred before he took office?
REASONING: Justice Stevens: Petitioner's principal submission--that "in all but the most exceptional cases," the Constitution affords the President temporary immunity from civil damages litigation arising out of events that occurred before he took office--cannot be sustained on the basis of precedent.
Only three sitting Presidents have been defendants in civil litigation involving their actions prior to taking office. Complaints against Theodore Roosevelt and Harry Truman had been dismissed before they took office; the dismissals were affirmed after their respective inaugurations. Two companion cases arising out of an automobile accident were filed against John F. Kennedy in 1960 during the Presidential campaign. After taking office, he unsuccessfully argued that his status as Commander in Chief gave him a right to a stay under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940. The motion for a stay was denied by the District Court, and the matter was settled out of court. Thus, none of those cases sheds any light on the constitutional issue before us.
The principal rationale for affording certain public servants immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct. In cases involving prosecutors, legislators, and judges we have repeatedly explained that the immunity serves the public interest in enabling such officials to perform their designated functions effectively without fear that a particular decision may give rise to personal liability....
That rationale provided the principal basis for our holding that a former President of the United States was "entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts." Our central concern was to avoid rendering the President "unduly cautious in the discharge of his official duties."
This reasoning provides no support for an immunity for unofficial conduct. As we explained in Fitzgerald, "the sphere of protected action must be related closely to the immunity's justifying purposes." Because of the President's broad responsibilities, we recognized in that case an immunity from damages claims arising out of official acts extending to the "outer perimeter of his authority." But we have never suggested that the President, or any other official, has an immunity that extends beyond the scope of any action taken in an official capacity.
Moreover, when defining the scope of an immunity for acts clearly taken within an official capacity, we have applied a functional approach. "Frequently our decisions have held that an official's absolute immunity should extend only to acts in performance of particular functions of his office." As our opinions have made clear, immunities are grounded in "the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it."
Petitioner's effort to construct an immunity from suit for unofficial acts grounded purely in the identity of his office is unsupported by precedent.
DECISION: Affirmed.
RULE: No, immunities are grounded in the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it. Immunities apply only to official acts so that officials do not fear personal liability from execution of their official duties.
CONCURRING: Justice Breyer [omitted from text]
DISSENTING: None.
NOTES AND COMMENTS: Two cases were cited in the decision, Nixon v. Fitzgerald (1982) and Marbury v. Madison (1803). Fitzgerald was referenced in the district court decision and again in the Supreme Court’s decision. The Marbury v. Madison (1803) quotation was one of the most memorable and key parts of that decision; “it is emphatically the province of the judicial department to say what the law is.”
Showing posts with label constitution. Show all posts
Showing posts with label constitution. Show all posts
Monday, October 8, 2007
Constitutional Law Brief - Eakin v. Raub (1825)
This is probably the last crappy brief I did. After this brief I started to catch on to this a bit better. Note that the formatting is stripped from this brief from the copying and pasting process.
Eakin v. Raub, 12 Sergeant & Rawle (Pennsylvania Supreme Court) 330 (1825)
FACTS: None given.
ISSUE: Is Justice Marshall’s concept of judicial review proper?
REASONING: Justice Gibson: It is the business of the judiciary to interpret the laws, not scan the authority of the lawgiver; and without the latter, it cannot take cognizance of a collision between a law and the constitution. So that to affirm that the judiciary has a right to judge of the existence of such collision, is to take for granted the very thing to be proved.
In theory, all the organs of the government are of equal capacity; or, if not equal, each must be supposed to have superior capacity only for those things which peculiarly belong to it; and as legislation peculiarly involves the consideration of those limitations which are put on the law-making power, and the interpretation of the laws when made, involves only the construction of the laws themselves, it follows, that the construction of the Constitution, in this particular, belongs to the legislature, which ought, therefore, to be taken to have superior capacity to judge of the constitutionality of its own acts.
I am of [the] opinion, that it rests with the people, in whom full and absolute sovereign power resides, to correct abuses in legislation, by instructing the representatives to repeal the obnoxious act. What is wanting to plenary power in the government, is reserved by the people, for their own immediate use; and to redress infringement of their rights in this respect, would seem to be an accessory of the power thus reserved. It might, perhaps, have been better to vest the power in the judiciary; as it might be expected, that its habits of deliberation, and the aid derived from the arguments of counsel, would more frequently lead to accurate conclusions. On the other hand, the judiciary is not infallible; and an error by it would admit of no remedy but a more distinct expression of the public will, through the extraordinary medium of a convention; whereas, an error by the legislature admits of a remedy by an exertion of the same will, in the ordinary exercise of the right of suffrage — a mode better calculated to attain the end, without popular excitement. It may be said, the people would probably not notice an error of their representatives. But they would as probably do so, as notice an error of the judiciary; and beside, it is a postulate in the theory of our government, and the very basis of the superstructure, that the people are wise, virtuous, and competent to manage their own affairs.
NOTES AND COMMENTS: From this decision, it appears that both Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Gibson agree that the will of the people is supreme; however, the two justices have different opinions of how the people exercise their will. Chief Justice Marshall believes that the will of the people is expressed through the constitution; Justice Gibson believes that the will of the people is expressed through the ballot.
Eakin v. Raub, 12 Sergeant & Rawle (Pennsylvania Supreme Court) 330 (1825)
FACTS: None given.
ISSUE: Is Justice Marshall’s concept of judicial review proper?
REASONING: Justice Gibson: It is the business of the judiciary to interpret the laws, not scan the authority of the lawgiver; and without the latter, it cannot take cognizance of a collision between a law and the constitution. So that to affirm that the judiciary has a right to judge of the existence of such collision, is to take for granted the very thing to be proved.
In theory, all the organs of the government are of equal capacity; or, if not equal, each must be supposed to have superior capacity only for those things which peculiarly belong to it; and as legislation peculiarly involves the consideration of those limitations which are put on the law-making power, and the interpretation of the laws when made, involves only the construction of the laws themselves, it follows, that the construction of the Constitution, in this particular, belongs to the legislature, which ought, therefore, to be taken to have superior capacity to judge of the constitutionality of its own acts.
I am of [the] opinion, that it rests with the people, in whom full and absolute sovereign power resides, to correct abuses in legislation, by instructing the representatives to repeal the obnoxious act. What is wanting to plenary power in the government, is reserved by the people, for their own immediate use; and to redress infringement of their rights in this respect, would seem to be an accessory of the power thus reserved. It might, perhaps, have been better to vest the power in the judiciary; as it might be expected, that its habits of deliberation, and the aid derived from the arguments of counsel, would more frequently lead to accurate conclusions. On the other hand, the judiciary is not infallible; and an error by it would admit of no remedy but a more distinct expression of the public will, through the extraordinary medium of a convention; whereas, an error by the legislature admits of a remedy by an exertion of the same will, in the ordinary exercise of the right of suffrage — a mode better calculated to attain the end, without popular excitement. It may be said, the people would probably not notice an error of their representatives. But they would as probably do so, as notice an error of the judiciary; and beside, it is a postulate in the theory of our government, and the very basis of the superstructure, that the people are wise, virtuous, and competent to manage their own affairs.
NOTES AND COMMENTS: From this decision, it appears that both Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Gibson agree that the will of the people is supreme; however, the two justices have different opinions of how the people exercise their will. Chief Justice Marshall believes that the will of the people is expressed through the constitution; Justice Gibson believes that the will of the people is expressed through the ballot.
Constitutional Law Case Brief - Marbury v. Madison (1803)
Note that this was one of the first cases I briefed. I don't think I did that great of a job. Also note that a lot of the formatting has been stripped in the pasting process. For example, the names of the parties are not properly underlined and the spacing is off. That's just what you get on a free site. Remember, no plagiarizing! This is just an example!
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803)
FACTS: Weeks before leaving office, President John Adams nominated William Marbury and others to be justices of the peace in the District of Columbia. Their nominations were confirmed and commissions signed by the president, but the secretary of state, John Marshall, had not delivered them by the time Thomas Jefferson became president. Jefferson’s new secretary of state, James Madison, refused to deliver the commissions of Marbury and three others. The four men requested that the Supreme Court issue a writ of mandamus ordering delivery under its original jurisdiction authorized in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Mandamus was not requested from lower federal courts.
ISSUE: There are two issues in this case. First, does Marbury have a right to the commission he demands? Second, if he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of this country afford him a remedy?
REASONING: Chief Justice Marshall: Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the President, and sealed by the Secretary of State, was appointed; and as the law creating the office, gave the officer a right to hold for five years, independent of the executive, the appointment was not revocable, but vested in the officer legal rights, which are protected by the laws of his country. To withhold his commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right…
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.
The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States authorizes the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.
The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; and, consequently, in some form, may be exercised over the present case; because the right claimed is given by a law of the United States.
In the distribution of this power it is declared that "the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.
If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to apportion the judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be vested. The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, if such is to be the construction. If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance.
The authority, therefore, given to the Supreme Court, by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution and it becomes necessary to inquire whether a jurisdiction so conferred can be exercised.
The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution can become the law of the land is a question deeply interesting to the United States...
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different departments their respective powers. It may either stop here, or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments. The constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution. It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank. Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.
DECISION: Rule discharged.
RULE: The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The authority given to the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the Constitution; therefore, the court can not force Madison to deliver the commissions.
DISSENTING: None
NOTES AND COMMENTS: This case is one of the most well-known court cases because of Marshall’s decision which established judicial review. His statement that “it is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is” has established the framework for judicial determination of the law.
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803)
FACTS: Weeks before leaving office, President John Adams nominated William Marbury and others to be justices of the peace in the District of Columbia. Their nominations were confirmed and commissions signed by the president, but the secretary of state, John Marshall, had not delivered them by the time Thomas Jefferson became president. Jefferson’s new secretary of state, James Madison, refused to deliver the commissions of Marbury and three others. The four men requested that the Supreme Court issue a writ of mandamus ordering delivery under its original jurisdiction authorized in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Mandamus was not requested from lower federal courts.
ISSUE: There are two issues in this case. First, does Marbury have a right to the commission he demands? Second, if he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of this country afford him a remedy?
REASONING: Chief Justice Marshall: Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the President, and sealed by the Secretary of State, was appointed; and as the law creating the office, gave the officer a right to hold for five years, independent of the executive, the appointment was not revocable, but vested in the officer legal rights, which are protected by the laws of his country. To withhold his commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right…
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.
The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States authorizes the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.
The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; and, consequently, in some form, may be exercised over the present case; because the right claimed is given by a law of the United States.
In the distribution of this power it is declared that "the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.
If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to apportion the judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be vested. The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, if such is to be the construction. If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance.
The authority, therefore, given to the Supreme Court, by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution and it becomes necessary to inquire whether a jurisdiction so conferred can be exercised.
The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution can become the law of the land is a question deeply interesting to the United States...
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different departments their respective powers. It may either stop here, or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments. The constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution. It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank. Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.
DECISION: Rule discharged.
RULE: The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The authority given to the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the Constitution; therefore, the court can not force Madison to deliver the commissions.
DISSENTING: None
NOTES AND COMMENTS: This case is one of the most well-known court cases because of Marshall’s decision which established judicial review. His statement that “it is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is” has established the framework for judicial determination of the law.
Why Study Constitutional Law?
"He who sacrifices freedom for security deserves neither" is a quote that has been attributed to the great Ben Franklin. It is for this reason, among others, that it is important to study Constitutional Law. I spent a little time on YouTube today and found this interesting clip about habeas corpus rights which are the rights for those detained to question the reasoning for their detention and receive relief if they are being unlawfully detained.
Regardless of your political persuasion and how you feel about this issue, knowledge of Constitutional Law and your rights guaranteed by the Constitution are important to good citizenship!
Regardless of your political persuasion and how you feel about this issue, knowledge of Constitutional Law and your rights guaranteed by the Constitution are important to good citizenship!
Constitutional Law Case Briefs - Why I created this blog!
Let me start by saying that I am totally against plagiarizing and you do not have permission to copy and paste my Constitutional Law case briefs and turn them in as your own work. I have created this blog because I know that it can be difficult doing these briefs when you have never done them before. The briefs I list on this site are only for use as a guide in creating your own. I recommend that you do your own brief first and compare it to mine to get additional insight. I am a good student, but these briefs are not necessarily perfect. Also, you should know that I am not a law school student. I am an undergrad taking this course in the political science department at a public university. If you are attending a Tier One law school and you turn my brief in, your professor may make fun of you :)
So far, Constitutional Law has been a very interesting course and it definitely has caused me to consider pursuing a career in the legal field. We'll see if I still like it after another 8 weeks of briefing cases. Note that I am only listing my briefs here that I had to type and turn in for credit. I briefed many more cases but they are handwritten; if you want to pay me, I might type them up for you. Since you are not paying me, you only get the ones that I have already typed and I can easily copy and paste.
So if you're taking Constitutional Law right now, good luck! It will probably be a very demanding class, but it will also probably be very fun too! Enjoy!
P.S. Let me reiterate - no plagiarism! You have come to far in school to get to this point; don't screw it up by copying my second-rate case briefs :)
So far, Constitutional Law has been a very interesting course and it definitely has caused me to consider pursuing a career in the legal field. We'll see if I still like it after another 8 weeks of briefing cases. Note that I am only listing my briefs here that I had to type and turn in for credit. I briefed many more cases but they are handwritten; if you want to pay me, I might type them up for you. Since you are not paying me, you only get the ones that I have already typed and I can easily copy and paste.
So if you're taking Constitutional Law right now, good luck! It will probably be a very demanding class, but it will also probably be very fun too! Enjoy!
P.S. Let me reiterate - no plagiarism! You have come to far in school to get to this point; don't screw it up by copying my second-rate case briefs :)
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)