Constitutional Law Brief - Eakin v. Raub (1825)

This is probably the last crappy brief I did. After this brief I started to catch on to this a bit better. Note that the formatting is stripped from this brief from the copying and pasting process.

Eakin v. Raub, 12 Sergeant & Rawle (Pennsylvania Supreme Court) 330 (1825)

FACTS: None given.

ISSUE: Is Justice Marshall’s concept of judicial review proper?

REASONING: Justice Gibson: It is the business of the judiciary to interpret the laws, not scan the authority of the lawgiver; and without the latter, it cannot take cognizance of a collision between a law and the constitution. So that to affirm that the judiciary has a right to judge of the existence of such collision, is to take for granted the very thing to be proved.
In theory, all the organs of the government are of equal capacity; or, if not equal, each must be supposed to have superior capacity only for those things which peculiarly belong to it; and as legislation peculiarly involves the consideration of those limitations which are put on the law-making power, and the interpretation of the laws when made, involves only the construction of the laws themselves, it follows, that the construction of the Constitution, in this particular, belongs to the legislature, which ought, therefore, to be taken to have superior capacity to judge of the constitutionality of its own acts.
I am of [the] opinion, that it rests with the people, in whom full and absolute sovereign power resides, to correct abuses in legislation, by instructing the representatives to repeal the obnoxious act. What is wanting to plenary power in the government, is reserved by the people, for their own immediate use; and to redress infringement of their rights in this respect, would seem to be an accessory of the power thus reserved. It might, perhaps, have been better to vest the power in the judiciary; as it might be expected, that its habits of deliberation, and the aid derived from the arguments of counsel, would more frequently lead to accurate conclusions. On the other hand, the judiciary is not infallible; and an error by it would admit of no remedy but a more distinct expression of the public will, through the extraordinary medium of a convention; whereas, an error by the legislature admits of a remedy by an exertion of the same will, in the ordinary exercise of the right of suffrage — a mode better calculated to attain the end, without popular excitement. It may be said, the people would probably not notice an error of their representatives. But they would as probably do so, as notice an error of the judiciary; and beside, it is a postulate in the theory of our government, and the very basis of the superstructure, that the people are wise, virtuous, and competent to manage their own affairs.

NOTES AND COMMENTS: From this decision, it appears that both Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Gibson agree that the will of the people is supreme; however, the two justices have different opinions of how the people exercise their will. Chief Justice Marshall believes that the will of the people is expressed through the constitution; Justice Gibson believes that the will of the people is expressed through the ballot.