Constitutional Law Case Brief - City of Boerne v. Flores (1997)

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City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)

FACTS: A Catholic Archbishop in San Antonio applied for a building permit to enlarge a church in Boerne, Texas. Local officials denied his permit request under a historic preservation ordinance. The Archbishop challenged this denial, claiming that the denial was a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993. Congress enacted RFRA in response to Employment Division v. Smith (1990), which upheld, despite a challenge under the free exercise clause, the denial of unemployment benefits to Native Americans that lost their jobs because of ritual use of peyote. In RFRA, Congress, relying on previous Supreme Court decisions and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibited government agencies and officials from “substantially burden[ing]” the exercise of religion if the burden results from application of a law of general applicability, unless the government can establish that the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive way to further that interest. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas concluded that Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court decision.

ISSUE: Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993 violate the separation of powers in the Constitution?

REASONING: Justice Kennedy: All must acknowledge that Section 5 (of the Fourteenth Amendment is “a positive grant of legislative power” to Congress…it is also true, however, that “as broad as the congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited.”…Congress’ power under Section 5, however, extends only to “enforc[ing]” the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment…The design of the Amendment and the text of Section 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States.
Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right be changing what the right is…Were it not so, what Congress would be enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the “provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].”
Any suggestion that Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our case law. If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning, no longer would the Constitution be “superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.” It would be on a level with ordinary legislative acts.

DECISION: Reversed.

RULE: RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance. As a result, the law is unconstitutional.

DISSENTING: Justice O’Connor: The Court’s analysis of whether RFRA is a constitutional exercise of Congress’ Section 5 power…is premised on the assumption that Smith correctly interprets the Free Exercise Clause. This is an assumption that I do not accept.
The Free Exercise Clause is not simply an antidiscrimination principle that protects only against those laws that single out a religious practice for unfavorable treatment. Rather, the Clause is best understood as an affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in religious practices and conduct without permissible governmental interference, even when such conduct conflicts with a neutral, generally applicable law.

NOTES AND COMMENTS: This case is one of the classic examples of Congress trying to overturn a court decision with a statute. This tactic is rarely successful; a constitutional amendment is they only surefire remedy for Congress to get its way.